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Developmental Disability

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The download of the file doesn't work through the LB of the Netscaler when it is associated with WAF as the current scenario (Content-length not being correct) is a RFC violation and AppFW resets the connection, which doesn't happen when WAF policy is not associated.

The Mutopia Project offers sheet music editions of classical music for free download. These are based on editions in the public domain. A team of volunteers typesets the music using LilyPond software. Why not join them! See the page on how to contribute for more information.

All of the music on Mutopia may be freely downloaded, printed, copied, distributed, modified, performed and recorded. Music is supplied as PDF files for easy printing on either A4 or US Letter paper. The LilyPond source files are also available, which allow you to make your own editions based on ours. Computer-generated audio previews of the music are available as MIDI files, to give you a rough idea of what the music sounds like.

As Hirasawa objected to the American response after the September 11 attacks, which he believes involved excessive carnage, and the Japanese government's aiding of such actions, he offered downloads of online banners and two of his songs for free, which he hoped would be used as tools of objection.[22] One of them is a rerecording of 1994's "Love Song", which is about children in the battlefield; the other is "High-Minded Castle", about a man who "can not know the truth and true background through media, he tries to face the real tragedy on the other side of the world". The latter was taken from the Blue Limbo album, which displays a dystopian theme partly influenced by the American government's retaliation.

On August 1st, 2022, it was announced, that Will of the People would also be releasing as an NFT, available on the platform called "Serenade".[28] Limited to 1000 copies, it is the first new music format to be charted in the UK since 2015, when music streaming data started counting in the charts, alongside CD, LP and download sales. The NFT cover art is slightly different to the standard one, featuring a purple/blue colour scheme, instead of the orange/blue one, and also featuring Muse's signatures on the digital cover itself.

On Feb. 1, 2022, Unit 42 observed an attack targeting an energy organization in Ukraine. CERT-UA publicly attributed the attack to a threat group they track as UAC-0056. The targeted attack involved a spear phishing email sent to an employee of the organization, which used a social engineering theme that suggested the individual had committed a crime. The email had a Word document attached that contained a malicious JavaScript file that would download and install a payload known as SaintBot (a downloader) and OutSteel (a document stealer). Unit 42 discovered that this attack was just one example of a larger campaign dating back to at least March 2021, when Unit 42 saw the threat group target a Western government entity in Ukraine, as well as several Ukrainian government organizations.

The use of email as the attack vector remains the same in all attacks carried out by this threat group. While the spear phishing emails are a common component, each attack uses a slightly different infection chain to compromise the system. For instance, the actors have included links to Zip archives that contain malicious shortcuts (LNK) within the spear phishing emails, as well as attachments in the form of PDF documents, Word documents, JavaScript files and Control Panel File (CPL) executables. Even the Word documents attached to emails have used a variety of techniques, including malicious macros, embedded JavaScript and the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 to install payloads onto the system. With the exception of the CPL executables, most of the delivery mechanisms rely on PowerShell scripts to download and execute code from remote servers.

The executable initially downloaded by the JavaScript in the delivery document is an initial loader Trojan, whose developers signed using a certificate (SHA1: 60aac9d079a28bd9ee0372e39f23a6a92e9236bd) that has "Electrum Technologies GmbH" within the organization field. This is related to the Electrum Bitcoin wallet, as seen in the following:

Once the script has finished uploading all relevant files to the C2, it will then attempt to download a file to %TEMP%\svjhost.exe from the secondary hardcoded C2 eumr[.]site. The downloaded payload is a sample of the SaintBot .NET loader, also extracted from the SHCore2 DLL, and if downloaded successfully, will be executed via the command line.

de:regsvr32Execute an EXE or DLL (using regsvr32) via cmd.exede:LoadMemorySpawn copy of dfrgui.exe and inject downloaded executable into process de:LLDownload DLL and load into memory with LdrLoadDll()updateUpdate SaintBot binaryuninstallUninstall SaintBot from machineTable 3. SaintBot commands.

The PDF document attached to the delivery email contains text that suggests the individual can access a Bitcoin wallet with a large sum of money along with a link to download the wallet, as seen in Figure 24. The link cutt[.]ly/McXG1ft is shortened and points to the URL [.]site/doc/ to download a Zip archive.

The Zip archive contains a LNK shortcut that runs a powershell script to download and execute a payload from hxxp://1924[.]site/soft/09042021.exe. The archive also contains a password.txt file that has the following contents, which involve an Electrum Bitcoin wallet that links back to the attacks against Ukraine on Feb. 1, 2022:

The LNK shortcut downloads the executable from the URL above using the Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet, which is the same technique the threat group used to download the payload within the macro in the July 2021 attacks discussed below.

The Control Panel File saves the downloaded executable to %PUBLIC%\puttys.exe and runs it using the WinExec function. The resulting executable (SHA256: df3b1ad5445d628c24c1308aa6cb476bd9a06f0095a2b285927964339866b2c3) eventually runs the OutSteel document stealer, which will exfiltrate files to the following URL:

This PowerShell script will download and execute a Control Panel File (CPL) from 150520212[.]space, which it saves to a file named 000.cpl (SHA256: b72188ba545ad865eb34954afbbdf2c9e8ebc465a87c5122cebb711f41005939). The 000.cpl is a DLL whose functional code exists within the exported function CPlApplet. The functional code uses several consecutive jumps in an attempt to make code analysis more difficult. Despite these jumps, the functional code starts with a decryption stub, which will XOR each QWORD in the ciphertext using a key that starts as 0x29050D91. However, in each iteration of the decryption loop, the key is modified by multiplying it by 0x749507B5 and adding 0x29050D91.

The kpd1974.exe file (SHA256: b8ce958f56087c6cd55fa2131a1cd3256063e7c73adf36af313054b0f17b7b43) downloaded and executed by the macro ultimately runs a variant of the OutSteel document harvesting tool that exfiltrates files to hxxp://45.146.165[.]91:8080/upld/. We found two additional delivery documents that shared a similar macro and hosted the payload on the 1833[.]site, as seen in Table 5. One of the filenames of these two related documents suggest that the threat group continued to use the fake resume theme. 59ce067264


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